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SECTION 301(a) AND THE EMPLOYEE:
AN ILLUSORY REMEDY
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act1 provides that any
federal district court may hear suits based upon the breach of a contract between
an employer and a labor organization. 2 Although it would appear that the basic
purpose of the section was to "give to employers the right to sue a union in
interstate commerce, in a Federal court, for violation of contract," 3 the United
States Supreme Court, in Smith v. Evening News Ass'n,4 held that an individual
employee may sue, under section 301 (a), for a breach of the collective bargain-
ing agreement between his employer and his union.5
Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Smith, noted that the majority opinion "studi-
ously refrains from saying when, for what kinds of breach, or under what cir-
cumstances an individual employee can bring a Section 301 action .. ..fO And
in 1965, just three years after Smith, in another dissent, Mr. Justice Black
underscored his Smith observation by adding, in Simmons v. Union News Co.,7
that although the Supreme Court "has not yet gone so far as to say that where
there is a personal grievance for breach of a collective bargaining agreement,
1. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-HartIey Act) § 301(a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
2. "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization rep-
resenting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between
any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the dtizenship of the parties." Ibid.
3. 93 Cong. Rec. 5014 (1947) (remarks of Senator Ball). (Emphasis added.) "[A] fair
reading of § 301 in the context of its enactment shows that the suit that Congress primarily
contemplated was the suit against a union for strike in violation of contract.... [W]e might
in turn find a federal right in the union to sue for a lockout in violation of contract." Tex-
tile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 479 (dissenting opinion).
But there is language in the congressional debates which indicates that an individual em-
ployee's suit was contemplated by the section. Congressman Hartley, a drafter of the section,
acknowledged the following statement as accurate: "[I]n other words, proceedings could ...
be brought by the employers, the labor organizations, or interested individual (sic] ... to
secure declarations from the Court of legal rights under the contract." 93 Cong. Rec. 3656-57
(1947) (remarks of Congressmen Barden and Hartley). See 93 Cong. Rec. 4207 (1947) (re-
marks of Senator Morse).
For the legislative history of section 301(a), see, e.g., Appendix to Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 485.
4. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
5. The Court interpreted the word "between" in the section as referring to "contracts,"
and not to "suits." Id. at 200.
6. Id. at 204 (dissenting opinion).
7. 382 U.S. 884 (1965). The Supreme Court here denied certiorari. The case is reported
below at 341 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1965).
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the employee can be deprived of an independent judicial determination of the
claim by an agreement between the union and the employer that no breach
exists ...denial of certiorari in this case . . . will undoubtedly lead people
to believe, and I fear with cause, that this Court is now approving such a for-
feiture of contractual claims of individual employees."8
II. FINAL DETERMINATION CLAUSES
A. Generally
Simmons arose out of the same facts as did an earlier case, Hildreth v. Union
News Co.,9 in which the Supreme Court also denied certiorari. In Hildreth, the
Sixth Circuit rejected plaintiff-employee's contention that Smith constituted
a basis upon which to reverse its earlier decision' ° barring the employee's section
301(a) action. The collective bargaining agreement in Hildreth had stipulated
that an employee could be discharged for "just cause" only;" plaintiff argued
that his dismissal was not for "just cause" and was thus in violation of the
contract.12 The contract stipulated that a union-employer agreement that an
employee's discharge was for "just cause" would be "final and binding upon
the parties.' 83 This final determination clause formed the basis of the subse-
quent decision, where the court held that:
The right of an individual employee to process an alleged grievance is not the issue
in this case. Rather, it is whether ... the Union had the authority .. .to agree with
the [employer] .. .on necessary corrective measures . . . without such action being
treated as a breach of the collective bargaining agreement.14
Consequently, the final determination clause in the collective bargaining con-
tract constituted an effective affirmative defense.
The import of this holding was aptly summarized in a later Fifth Circuit case,
which, referring to Hildreth, observed that "the doors of the court were open
but the claim was barred."' It would appear that whatever the theoretical
merit of the distinction adhered to in Hildreth, its practical effect is that it
renders Smith nugatory from the standpoint of the individual employee. This
conclusion follows from the fact that an overwhelming proportion of collective
bargaining agreements contain a final determination clause similar to the one
in Hildretk; that is, some provision to the effect that a determination under
the grievance procedure shall be "final and binding upon the parties."'1 This
8. 382 U.S. at 886 (dissenting opinion). (Emphasis added.)
9. 315 F.2d 548 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 826 (1963).
10. Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961).
11. Id. at 660.
12. Id. at 662.
13. Id. at 660.
14. 315 F.2d at 551.
15. Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 362 F.2d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 1966).
16. Ninety percent of collective bargaining agreements in the United States provide for
grievance and arbitration procedures. 2 BNA Collective Bargaining Negotiations and Con-
tracts 51:6-7 (1965). "Arbitration," by definition, is to be a "final determination." Ibid.
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fact, coupled with the fact that Mr. Justice Black's dissents in Smith and Sim-
mons have not deterred subsequent tribunals from adhering to the Hildreth
rationale,' 7 would seem to justify the conclusion that union and management,
simply by including a final determination clause in the collective bargaining
contract, may effectively bar judicial review of the merits of an employee's
breach of contract suit. Yet, in referring to the Supreme Court's decision in
Humphrey v. Moore,'8 a case in which the collective bargaining agreement
also contained a final determination clause,' 9 the American Bar Association
Section of Labor Relations Law reported that "the most important rule of law
... emerging from Humphrey v. Moore is that, by ruling on the merits of the
claim, the Supreme Court confirmed the plaintiff's standing to sue, thus rejecting
the view that the grievance-arbitration procedures constitute the individual
employee's 'exclusive' remedy." 20 Since it is true that the Humphrey Court ex-
pressly went to the "merits" 2' of the plaintiff-employee's section 301(a) claim,
the ABA's logic would appear to be correct. But, since a court's acceptance of
a final determination clause as an affirmative defense precludes a consideration
of the merits of the claimed breach of contract, it would seem that the ABA's
conclusion contradicts the intimation, to be found in a recent Fifth Circuit
case, 2 that Humphrey recognized a final determination clause as an affirmative
defense. An understanding of this seeming contradiction will provide an in-
sight into the circumstances in which a collective bargaining agreement that is
expressly intended to be an exclusive remedy will, in fact, bar a section 301 (a)
suit by an employee.
B. Humphrey v. Moore
1. Two Levels of "Merits"
The Humphrey Court relied on Smith2s in acknowledging jurisdiction of the
employee's24 suit to enjoin implementation of a joint employer-union decision,2
Furthermore, in every case examined by this writer, union-management agreement prior
to the arbitration step was, by the terms of the agreement, to constitute a "final" determina-
tion.
17. E.g., Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 362 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1966);
Serra v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc., 248 FSupp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1965). See text accom-
panying notes 72-84 infra.
18. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
19. See text accompanying notes 33-35 infra.
20. Report of the Committee on Labor Arbitration and the Law of Collective Bargaining
Agreements, ABA Section of Labor Relations Law, 1965 Ann. Rep. 254, 271. (Footnote
omitted.)
21. "We now come to the merits of this case." 375 U.S. at 344.
22. In Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co, 362 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1966), the
court stated: "The action under the grievance procedure, here a final decision under the
terms of the agreement, may be asserted in bar as an affirmative defense.... [Clf. Humphrey
v. Moore. . . ." Id. at 418. See text accompanying note 46 infra.
23. 375 US. at 344.
24. This suit was a das action in which the plaintiff represented the discharged em-
ployees. 375 U.S. at 340.
25. Actually, the decision was rendered by a Joint Conference Committee "upon which
1967]
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resulting in his discharge, which purported to settle certain grievances in ac-
cordance with the collective bargaining agreement. The plaintiff's suit was
advanced on two claims. First, he alleged that the joint committee exceeded its
powers as defined by the collective bargaining contract; 20 secondly, he alleged
that the committee's decision was the result of "dishonest union conduct; "O
that is, that the union breached its duty of fair representation.
The first claim clearly was within the ambit of a section 301 (a) action for
violation of the collective bargaining contract. 28 The employee alleged that the
committee's decision, which was "expressly recited" to be in accordance with
section 5 of the contract, was a nullity because it was reached in a situation
in which the contract did not empower the committee to act.3o Specifically,
section 5 of the collective bargaining contract provided that in the case of an
"absorption" of another business by the employer, "'the seniority of the em-
ployees absorbed or affected thereby shall be determined by mutual agreement
between the Employer and the Unions involved. 'Any controversy with respect
the employers and the unions in the overall bargaining unit had an equal number of rep-
resentatives." Id. at 338. At least one commentator has considered this fact crucial, and has
remarked: "[TIhe joint conference committee did not constitute the contracting parties; it
was an arbitration board limited in its power to the settlement of disputes within the scope
of its authority under the agreement. . . . In short, Humphrey . . . merely ruled that the
court will entertain the conventional suit to set aside an arbitration award if it is alleged
that the arbitrator exceeded his authority under the terms of the agreement." Wyle, Labor
Arbitration and the Concept of Exclusive Representation, 7 Boston College Industrial and
Commercial L. Rev. 783, 794-95 (1966). (Footnotes omitted.) But there is no reason to
believe that the Humphrey decision would have differed had the committee been composed
exclusively of the contracting parties. In either situation, the contracting parties have the
right to agree that their decision as to an interpretation of a term in the contract shall be
final. Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Am. Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254, 263 (1962) ; cf.
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; United Steelworkers v. American
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). Indeed, several cases that have relied on Humphrey did not
appear to deem it relevant that parties in addition to the contracting parties were on the
committee that rendered the contested decision. E.g., Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry
Co., 362 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1966). Finally, the Humphrey Court itself did not appear to at-
tach any significance to the fact that non-contracting parties were on the committee.
26. 375 U.S. at 342.
27. Ibid.
28. Problems arise, however, in seeking justification for the Court's excursion to the
merits of the unfair representation charge. See text accompanying notes 54-61 infra.
29. "We need not consider the problem posed if § 5 had been omitted from the contract
or if the parties had acted to amend the provision. The fact is that they purported to pro-
ceed under the section. They deadlocked at the local level and it was pursuant to § 5 that
the matter was taken to the Joint Conference Committee which, under Art. 7, was to make
a decision 'after listening to testimony on both sides.' The committee expressly recited that
its decision was in accordance with § 5 of the contract." 375 U.S. at 345 n.7. See text accom-
panying notes 58-72 infra.
30. 375 U.S. at 342.
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to such matter shall be submitted to the joint grievance procedure.' "31 The
plaintiff contended that no "absorption," within the meaning of the contract, had
occurred, so any committee decision under section 5 was in violation of the
contract.
32
It is important, at this point, to examine what "final determination" pro-
visions were present in the collective bargaining agreement. One such provision
was that decisions of the committee were to be "'final and conclusive and bind-
ing upon the employer and the union, and the employees involved.' " Another
clause stated that "'all matters pertaining to the interpretation of any provision
of this Agreement ... must be submitted to the ... Committee ... which Com-
mittee ... shall make a decision.' ,34 And, as if these clauses were not explicit
enough to express an intention that the grievance procedure was to be exclusive,
another provision stated that it was "'the intention of the parties to resolve all
questions of interpretation by mutual agreement.' "31
Despite these various contract provisions, the Court, after having established
jurisdiction, stated: "We now come to the merits of this case."3  The Court
then decided that there was in fact an "absorption" within the meaning of
section 5 of the contract, 37 so that "the Joint Conference Committee's decision
... was a decision which § 5 empowered the committee to make.138 It might
appear, therefore, that, as the ABA Labor Law Section concluded, 3 Humphrey
does stand for the proposition that grievance-arbitration procedures may not
be made to constitute an employee's exclusive remedy. But a careful examina-
tion of the language in Humphrey reveals such a conclusion to be an over-
simplification. At the outset of the Court's discussion of the merits, the follow-
ing language appeared: "If we assume.. . that the Joint Conference Committee's
power was circumscribed by § 5 and that its interpretation of the section is
open to court review. . . [plaintiff's] cause is not measurably advanced. For in
our opinion the section reasonably meant what the Joint Committee said or as-
sumed it meant."40 In other words, the Court deemed it unnecessary to decide
whether interpretation of the contract was open to its review, because its de-
cision would have been against the plaintiff in any event. 41
The procedure followed by the Humphrey Court is plainly at variance with
31. Id. at 338.
32. Id. at 342.
33. Id. at 338.
34. Ibid.
35. Id. at 339.
36. Id. at 344.
37. Id. at 345-48.
38. Id. at 347-48.
39. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
40. 375 U.S. at 345. (Footnote omitted.) (Emphasis added.) Clearly, in stating that its
decision was in accord with § 5 of the contract, the committee was assuming that an ab-
sorption within the meaning of the section had occurred.
41. If the Court had found no "absorption," it then would have had to decide whether
it had the power to make such a finding. See text accompanying note 42 infra.
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the procedure followed by the Hildreth court. Hildreth simply recognized the
final determination clause in the contract as an affirmative defense; the merits
of plaintiff's claim were never considered. But Humphrey hypothetically went
to the merits of the claim immediately, and, on the basis of its finding against the
plaintiff on the merits, the Court deemed it unnecessary to render any decision
as to the efficacy of the final determination clause. In a footnote, the Court
stated:
We also put aside the union's contention that Art. 7, § (d) [of the contractj-provid-
ing that all matters of interpretation . . . be submitted to the Joint Conference Com-
mittee-makes it inescapably clear that the committee had the power to decide that
the transfer of operating authority was an absorption within the scope of § 5. But it is
by no means clear that this provision in Art. 7 was intended to apply to interpreta-
tions of § 5, for the latter section by its own terms appears to limit the authority of
the committee to disputes over seniority in the event of an absorption. Reconciliation
of these two provisions, going to the power of the committee under the contract, it-
self presented an issue ultimately for the court, not the committee, to decide. Our
view of the scope and applicability of § 5, infra, renders an accommodation of these
two sections unnecessary. 42
But if the provisions in the Humphrey contract43 did not render it clear to the
Supreme Court that it was the intention of the contracting parties that their
decision (as to whether there was an "absorption") should not be subject to
court review, what language would do so? It is unfortunate that the Court did
not expressly state what it deemed to be the source of this supposed unclarity.
Indeed, it would appear that such a contention could be supported only by a
showing that "all" does not in fact mean "all," and "any" does not in fact
mean "any." 44 Since the contract in Humphrey was at least as clear as the one
in Hildreth insofar as expressing an intention that union-management agreement
under the grievance procedure be beyond court review,45 Humphrey, in varying
from the Hildreth procedure, cast some confusion on the efficacy of final deter-
mination clauses.
But it is clear that Humphrey may not be properly viewed as authority by
which to deprive union and management of the power to provide that the griev-
ance procedure they establish be exclusive. A concluding sentence by the
Humphrey majority stated that "the decision of the committee, reached after
proceedings adequate under the agreement, is final and binding upon the parties,
just as the contract says it is." 46 Apparently, the Humphrey Court would con-
sider its decision to be in accord with Hildreth insofar as upholding the efficacy
of a "final determination" clause as an affirmative defense. Nonetheless, the
difference in approach suggests that the Supreme Court will recognize two
42. 375 U.S. at 345-46 n.8. (Emphasis added.)
43. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
44. Ibid.
45. Compare text accompanying note 13 supra with text accompanying notes 33-35
supra.
46. 375 U.S. at 351. (Emphasis added.)
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distinct levels of "merits" in considering an employee's section 301(a) claim:
one relating to the power of union and management to act in a particular situa-
tion; the other relating to decisions rendered in accordance with this power.
Under this view, the presence of a final determination clause notwithstanding,
union and management apparently will be subjected to court review of their
power to initiate procedures affecting employees, but not of their decisions
reached under procedures properly initiated.
At the very most, then, Humphrey indicates that union and management
must carefully draft the collective bargaining agreement if they want to insure
their immunity from an employee's attack on the ground that the grievance
procedure was improperly initiated. The irony of this aspect of the case is that
the requisite degree of care might be achieved by eliminating any specific con-
tract clause relating to the circumstances in which union and management
could act. For example, if the contract in Humphrey did not contain section 5,
the "absorption" section, and had provided only that "all disputes" be finally
settled by the joint Conference Committee,47 it would seem that the Court could
not have questioned whether the committee's decision was "reached after pro-
ceedings adequate under the agreement," so that it would have been forced to
recognize the final determination clause as an affirmative defense.
2. The Relevance of Alleging Unfair Representation
In Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,48 decided subsequent to Humphrey, the
Supreme Court ruled that an individual employee must at least attempt to
utilize the grievance procedure before he may bring suit under section 301 (a).40
The Maddox Court stated that "if the union refuses to press or only perfunc-
torily presses the individual's claim, differences may arise as to the forms of
redress then available. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335; Labor Board v.
Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172.'5 ° Since Humphrey was also a section 301 (a)
suit, this reference to it apparently indicates that Maddox interpreted Humplrey
to stand for the proposition that the grievance procedure is not an exclusive
remedy, 51 at least when the complaint, as it did in Humphrey, contains an alle-
gation of unfair representation on the part of the union. 52 Such an interpretation
of Humphrey is quite different from the one advanced by the ABA Report,5
47. Such general clauses are commonplace. See 5 P-H Lab. Arb. Serv. D1 64063-67.
48. 379 US. 650 (1965).
49. Id. at 652.
50. Ibid. (Emphasis added.) For a discussion of Miranda Fuel and its relevancy see note
57 infra.
51. Accord, Simmons v. Union News Co., 382 U.S. 884, 886 (Black, J, dissenting),
denying cert. in 341 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1965).
52. Clearly, in speaking of a union's refusal to conscientiously press individual grievances,
the Maddox Court was referring to unfair representation claims. Miranda Fuel Co, 140
NL.R.B. 181 (1962), mentioned by the Court in Maddox, also involved an unfair represen-
tation charge. See note 57 infra.
53. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
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which apparently did not deem the unfair representation claim to be relevant
to the determination of whether the grievance procedure may be exclusive.
Of course, the Humphrey Court was itself of the view that it was ruling on
an action "to enforce a collective bargaining contract" 54 and "arising under§ 301," so it is beyond question that "the real essence of the action was based
on a breach of such contract."56 But the Court did go to the merits of plaintiff's
unfair representation charge against the union, notwithstanding a finding that
the committee had not exceeded the powers expressly granted to it in the con-
tract, and notwithstanding the existing controversy of whether such charges are
a proper matter for judicial determination.57 The Humphrey Court stated that:
Although there are differing views on whether a violation of the duty of fair repre-
sentation is an unfair labor practice under the Labor Management Relations Act, it is
not necessary for us to resolve that difference here. Even if it is, or arguably may be,
54. 375 U.S. at 341.
55. Id. at 343.
56. Chasis v. Progress Mfg. Co., 256 F. Supp. 747, 751 (ED. Pa. 1966).
57. Prior to 1962, a union's duty of fair representation was plainly within the Juris-
diction of the courts. E.g., Syres v. Oil Workers Intl Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (per
curiam) ; Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953). But in Miranda Fuel Co.,
140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), the NLRB held that breach of a union's duty of fair representa-
tion constitutes an unfair labor practice under the NLRA and is, therefore, within the jur-
isdiction of the Board. Such jurisdiction would generally be exclusive. San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959). For a discussion of Miranda Fuel,
see, e.g., Sovern, Race Discrimination and the National Labor Relations Act: The Brave New
World of Miranda, 16 N.Y.U. Conf. Lab. 3 (1963); 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 711 (1964). The
Second Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's Miranda decision, NLRB v. Miranda
Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2nd Cir. 1963), albeit without a majority holding on the Board's
theory that a breach of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice. Judge
Medina rejected the Board's theory. Id. at 173-80. Judge Lumbard denied enforcement
on other grounds and did not consider the theory. Id. at 180. Judge Friendly dissented. Ibid.
Despite this division, unfair representation charges will presently be heard in the Second
Circuit. E.g., Hiller v. Liquor Salesmen's Union, 338 F.2d 778 (2nd Cir. 1964).
The Board has not been discouraged by the Second Circuit's Miranda Fuel holding. In
a recent case, the Board stated: "With due deference to the circuit court's opinion, we adhere
to our previous decision [Miranda] until such time as the Supreme Court of the United
States rules otherwise." Local 1367, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 148 N.L.R.B. 897, 898 n.7
(1964), enforced per curiam, 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966). Such a ruling may be forth-
coming, for the Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in a case in which the pre-
emption issue is squarely presented. Sipes v. Vaca, 384 U.S. 969 (1966) (granting certiorari).
But for the present, the Fifth Circuit, Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d
12 (5th Cir. 1966), Sixth Circuit, Knox v. UAW, 223 F. Supp. 1009, 1011 (ED. Mich. 1963),
aff'd, 351 F.2d 72 (6th Cir. 1965), and Eighth Circuit, District 9, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v.
Sterling Aluminum Prods., Inc., 4 CCH Lab. L. Rep. (54 Lab. Cas.) ff 11430 (8th Cir. Sept.
2, 1966), have upheld the Board's Miranda doctrine, and so have district courts in the Third
Circuit, Chasis v. Progress Mfg. Co., 256 F. Supp. 747 (ED. Pa. 1966), and in the Tenth
Circuit, Mendicki v. UAW, 4 CCH Lab. L. Rep. (54 Lab. Cas.) V 11438 (D. Kansas Dec.
23, 1965).
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an unfair labor practice, the complaint here alleged that Moore's discharge would vio-
late the contract and was therefore within the cognizance of federal .. courts .... 58
In other words, Humphrey stands for the proposition that, at least in some cir-
cumstances, a section 301 (a) claim is a proper vehicle with which to bring an
unfair representation charge in a federal court,"9 while at the same time, the
Court expressly declined to determine whether courts may properly consider
an unfair representation charge unconnected with any section 301 (a) allega-
tions.
But, the nature of the required nexus between the unfair representation
claim and the section 301 (a) claim is left uncertain. If a collective bargaining
contract is or is not breached irrespective of whether the union has discharged
its duty of fair representation,' ° then it would appear that the Humphrey Court
erred in going to the merits of the unfair representation charge. But perhaps
the Court's procedure bears a relation to the distinction that the Court apparently
drew between a union-management decision that there was power to act under
the contract, and a decision rendered in accordance with this power. Specifically,
since the duty of fair representation is paralleled by the power to (exclusively)
represent,6 ' it could be argued that the power is non-existent unless exercised
pursuant to the duty. In this view, a breach of the duty (i.e., unfair representa-
tion) by the union would preclude its power to participate in decisions, so that
an allegation of unfair representation would be tantamount to an allegation that
any determination by union-management is void and unenforceable. In other
words, unfair representation, per se, would render any collective bargaining de-
cision a breach of contract, and thus within the ambit of section 301 (a).
This interpretation would appear to find support in a footnote in Humphrey,
where the Court stated that "even in the absence of [the particular contract
provision that was allegedly breached] . . . it would be necessary to deal with
the alleged breach of the union's duty of fair representation." 02 But recently,
a court confronted with a motion to dismiss an employee's section 301 (a) claim,
58. 375 U.S. at 344. (Footnotes omitted.)
59. Mr. Justice Goldberg, in a concurring opinion in Humphrey, disagreed with the
Court's holding that an unfair representation charge may be brought under § 301(a). He
stated that "in my view, such a claim of breach of the union's duty of fair representation
cannot properly be treated as a claim of breach of the collective bargaining contract sup-
porting an action under § 301(a)." 375 U.S. at 355 (concurring opinion). Air. Justice
Goldberg further stated that the plaintiff's claim "must be treated as an individual
employee's action for a union's breach of its duty of fair representation-a duty derived
not from the collective bargaining contract but from the National Labor Relations Act .. .
Id. at 351.
60. That is, for example, had the discharge in Hildreth been for just cause, objectively
defined, then, in this view, even absent the final determination clause, there would not
have been a breach of contract, notwithstanding bad faith on the part of the union.
61. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 9(a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964). This section makes the union an exclusive representative for
the employees.
62. 375 U.S. at 345 n.7.
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which claim included a charge of unfair representation, deemed this footnote
in Humphrey to be simply an indication that Humphrey "realized that different
problems would be posed if there were no allegation of a breach of contract."0 3
This case, Chasis v. Progress Mjg. Co., 4 apparently did not consider an unfair
representation charge, per se, to fall within the ambit of section 301(a), as
it dismissed plaintiff's suit because no specific provisions of the collective bar-
gaining contract were alleged to have been breached.00 The language of Chasis,
and its reliance on Humphrey, make it clear that had the plaintiff in Chasis
alleged a breach of a specific contract clause, the court would have not only
gone to the merits of this allegation, but to the merits of the unfair representa-
tion charge as well.
Thus, Chasis viewed the "real essence"'0 of Humphrey to be the breach of
contract allegation, and not the unfair representation charge. But another case,
of which Chasis also said "the real essence of the action was based on a breach
of ... contract,"67 does not appear to have interpreted Humphrey in the same
manner as did Chasis. This case, Fuller v. Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers
Local 107,68 involved facts very similar to the facts in Humphrey.0 In refuting
the defendants' contention that the final determination clause of the collective
bargaining contract rendered the court powerless to review the merits of the
decision of which plaintiff complained, the Fuller court noted that
Plaintiffs' complaint is not directed merely to the Committee's interpretation of the
contract. They assert that that construction was reached as the result of conspiratorial
action between [the union and other labor forces] . . . on the one hand, and
[the employers] ... on the other. The distinction lies at the base of the Humphrey
decision [which] . . . held that both grounds [i.e., that the Joint Conference Commit-
tee exceeded its powers, and that the union breached its duty of fair representation]
stated a claim under § 301 of the Act.70
Of course, since, as Fuller itself recognized, the complaint in Humphrey "did not
charge employer participation in the union's breach of its duty of fair representa-
tion,"7 the "distinction" alluded to in Fuller must be based on the presence of
the unfair representation charge, not a charge of conspiracy between union and
employer. That is, the Fuller court apparently would have dismissed plaintiff's
63. Chasis v. Progress Mfg. Co., 256 F. Supp. 747, 750 n.6 (ED. Pa. 1966). It is true
that the Humphrey note stated the Court's view that it "need not consider the problem posed
if § 5 had been omitted from the contract . . . ." 375 U.S. at 345 n.7. But, it is submitted,
this language, and the context in which it appeared, was not related to the question of the
per se status of the unfair representation charge, and the other language in the note, quoted
in text accompanying note 62 supra, renders Humphrey's view on this matter unequivocal.
64. 256 F. Supp. 747 (ED. Pa. 1966).
65. Id. at 753.
66. Id. at 751.
67. Ibid.
68. 233 F. Supp. 115 (ED. Pa. 1964).
69. In Fuller, however, a union-employer conspiracy was alleged. Ibid.
70. Id. at 118-19. (Emphasis added.)
71. Id. at 118.
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complaint on the basis of the final determination clause of the contract were
there no allegation of unfair representation. So, Fuller's view of Humphrey differs
from Chasis' view. Chasis correctly deemed Humphrey to be similar to Fuller,
but failed to recognize the unfair representation charge as a critical element of
either case.
In view of the foregoing discussion, it is submitted that Chasis' interpretation
of Humphrey and of Fuller was erroneous; had Chasis considered the unfair
representation claim before it in the same manner as did Humphrey, it would
not have dismissed plaintiff's complaint.
In Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co.,7 2 the Fifth Circuit court
of appeals, relying on Hildreth,73 recently upheld a final determination clause
as an affirmative defense. But in so doing, the court deemed it worthy to observe
that the plaintiff-employee did "not contend that the union did not faithfully
represent him,"74 and cited Humphrey on the "duty of the union to do so."4
If, as it would appear, this language indicates that Haynes would have gone
to the merits of an unfair representation claim had plaintiff presented such a
claim, then Haynes is in accord with the interpretation of Humphrey presented
above; specifically, that an unfair representation charge, per se, is within the
ambit of section 301(a). This is especially true when it is realized that a suc-
cessful affirmative defense had been established by the defendant-employer in
Haynes;76 that is, since the plaintiff was suing for a breach of contract, and
since a final determination clause was deemed by the court to negate the pos-
sibility of a breach of any contract provision, the only conceivable reason why
the Haynes court would have considered the absence of an unfair representation
charge to have been relevant is if such a charge, per se, constituted an allegation
of breach of contract.
One further observation on Haynes substantiates this point. At the time that
Haynes was decided, the Fifth Circuit had yet to resolve the preemption contro-
versy with regard to unfair representation claims.77 So it may not fairly be pre-
sumed that the mention of the absence of such a claim was an indication that
the court would have gone to the merits of an unfair representation allegation
unaccompanied by a section 301 (a) claim. 78
72. 362 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1966).
73. Id. at 418; see text accompanying notes 9-14 supra.
74. 362 F.2d at 418.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. See note 57 supra. The Fifth Circuit subsequently decided this question in Local
12, United Rubber Workers v. NTLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966).
78. Haynes is of interest on another point. The court discussed the Maddox case, see
text accompanying notes 48-52 supra, at one point stating that Maddox "beld that the
individual employee is bound by the remedy selected by the union as his agent." 362 F.2d
at 417. But Maddox stands for no such proposition; it simply held that an attempt at
utilizing the contract remedy is a condition precedent to court aid. 379 US. at 652. In
fairness to the Haynes court, however, it would appear that its above quoted statement in
regard to Maddox was of unintended generality. This is so because Haynes went on to
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In Serra v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, InC., 79 the plaintiff-employee sought
reinstatement and back pay under section 301 (a).80 The court denied defendant-
employer's motion to dismiss, and refuted the defendant's contention that the
union was an indispensable party to the suit.8 ' But Serra does not refute any
of the contentions advanced above, for "in passing"82 the court observed that
"there is no evidence before the court at this time as to the reasons why the
union here declined to press the grievance. Accordingly, it may be that ultimately
the case will fall within the ambit of Hildreth .... "83 This remark would appear
to be of more than "passing" significance. The employee in Pepsi, as the em-
ployee in Hildreth, did not allege unfair representation; in neither case was the
union a defendant. This being so, the only explanation as to the relevance of
"why the union ... declined to press the grievance" is that the court would have
heard an unfair representation charge brought under section 301(a). And
absent such a charge, it is likely that the Pepsi plaintiff will be confronted with
a final determination clause that will bar his claim. 84
say that a "distinction between Maddox and the instant case is that Maddox, unlike the
employer [obviously meaning employee] here, made no effort to process his grievance ....
This presents the additional question of whether the doors of the court open after the
contractual remedy has been exhausted." 362 F.2d at 417. With regard to this question, the
Haynes court noted that the employee "argues that the implication may be gained from
some of the language . .. in Maddox that the employee may sue once he has exhausted his
remedy under the grievance procedure of the collective bargaining agreement. There is some
such language, but there is other language, equally compelling, to the contrary." Id. at
417-18. It has been submitted that Maddox's allusion to Humphrey is a proper basis for
inferring that the Maddox Court did not deem the grievance procedure to be the employee's
sole remedy in all circumstances. See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra. A careful
examination of Maddox fails to reveal any language from which the contrary conclusion
might be drawn. Maddox did discuss the desirability of making a grievance procedure ex-
clusive, but the context of this discussion was delineated by the Court's statement that
"it cannot be said, in the normal situation, that contract grievance procedures are In-
adequate to protect the interests of an aggrieved employee until the employee has attempted
to implement the procedure and found them so." 379 U.S. at 653. It would appear, therefore,
that Maddox in no way intimated that the grievance procedure is the individual's sole
recourse; Haynes would have done well to restrict its reliance to Hildreth. But perhaps
Haynes was troubled by the fact that if the plaintiff-employee's assertions about Maddox
were correct, the spirit-if not the holding-of Maddox and of Smith would stand contrary
to Hildreth.
79. 248 F. Supp. 684 (ND. Ill. 1965).
80. Id. at 685.
81. Id. at 688.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. Since there was no formal union-management agreement in Pepsi, it may be that a
final determination clause would be an affirmative defense only if the collective bargaining
contract stated that independent decisions by union and management that a grievance will
not be processed shall constitute a final determination with respect to the grievance. But
it is arguable that even absent such an express contract provision, independent determina-
tions not to process a grievance should be considered an agreement within the terms of the
collective bargaining contract.
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III. CONCLUSION
In Smith, the Court, in response to defendant-employer's assertion that sec-
tion 301(a) should not be made available to individual employees, stated that
"neither the language and structure of § 301 nor its legislative history requires
or persuasively supports this restrictive interpretation, which would frustrate
rather than serve the congressional policy expressed in that section."8 5 Since
the "legislative history of section 301 is somewhat cloudy and confusing,"SG
it cannot be said that Smith was without justification in declaring that section
301(a) is available to individual employees. But, to be juxtaposed with Smith
is the view that
Congress explicitly stated by way of a policy, in § 203(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29
U.S.C.A. § 173(d), that in settling grievance disputes, the Act contemplated that the
method agreed upon by parties to collective bargaining agreements should be the
means of settling such disputes.87
Although there is no theoretical conflict between following the "method agreed
upon" in the collective bargaining contract and allowing the individual employee
to sue for breach of this contract, the practical conflict is apparent; for, as has
already been stated,88 the "method agreed upon" almost always provides for
"an agreement... that no breach exists."8 19
Consequently, as has been seen, an aggrieved employee is likely to meet with
a situation in which his breach of contract claim will not be reviewed on its
merits. Of course, there are convincing reasons why such a result is desirable. 0°
It has not been the purpose of this comment to take issue with these reasons,
nor with the reasons supporting the contrary view. Rather, the purpose here
has been simply to examine the utility of section 301(a) to the aggrieved em-
ployee. This examination has revealed that it is a very simple matter for union
and management to preclude an employee's successful section 301(a) claim
when such a claim is unconnected with any allegation of unfair representation.
It need only be added that Humphrey's willingness to go to the merits of an
unfair representation claim brought under section 301(a) is likely to be of no
practical importance, for courts have proved an unfavorable forum for unfair
representation suits.91 Thus, for the aggrieved employee, the benefits of Smith
85. 371 U.S. at 200.
86. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 452 (1957). See note 3 supra.
87. Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 362 F.2d 414, 416 (5th Cir. 1966).
(Footnote omitted.)
88. See note 16 supra.
89. Simmons v. Union News Co., 382 U.S. 884, 886 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
90. See, e.g., Wyle, Labor Arbitration and the Concept of Exclusive Representation,
7 Boston College Industrial and Commercial L. Rev. 783 (1966).
91. "[Tlhe adequacy of existing judicial remedies afforded individual unfair representa-
tion claims has been seriously questioned. Under current practice, the aggrieved employee
is not only compelled to bear the substantial expense of an individual lawsuit, but must
also face the burden of overcoming the strong judicial presumption of legality of union
action in this area. Thus confronted with jurisdictional, monetary and procedural obstacles,
the individual employee may well find his right to fair representation as enforced by the
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and Humphrey are entirely theoretical. But these cases may present a real detri-
ment to the advancement of the employee's cause, for in their recognition of
abstract rights, they may well be concealing the absence of any concrete rights.
If the employee is to be denied a bona fide opportunity to contest, in court, a
collective bargaining decision that adversely affects him, this "should be clearly
and unequivocally announced by [the Supreme Court] . ..so that Congress
can, if it sees fit, consider this question and protect the just claims of employees
from the joint power of employers and unions."9 2*
courts more theoretical than real." Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d
12, 23 (5th Cir. 1966). (Footnote omitted.) See, e.g., Blumrosen, The Worker and Three
Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship,
61 Mich. L. Rev. 1435, 1470 (1963), which was cited by the Rubber Workers court, 368
F.2d at 23 n.22.
It should be realized that "a successful suit against the union will only result in an award
of damages." Serra v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 684, 688 (N.D. Ill. 1965) ;
cf. Thompson v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 258 F. Supp. 235, 240 (E.D. Va. 1966) (mem-
orandum decision). So even if the employee were to succeed in an unfair representation
suit, he would still be unable to obtain reinstatement.
In addition to the fact that the courts would seem to be an unfavorable forum for an
unfair representation suit, there are compelling positive reasons for the individual to
advocate that unfair representation claims be handled by the NLRB. First, while court
expenses can be costly, the cost of filing a charge with the Board is nominal. Secondly,
the Board's investigatory power would assure an accurate picture of what occurred during
the grievance procedure, and thus allow that forum to decide the issue from a more realistic
viewpoint than the one presented by the union and the employer to the courts. Further-
more, the unfair representation suit, as classified by the Board in Miranda, would fall
into the category of charges which take predominance over all other charges before the
Board. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 160(m), 73 Stat. 545 (1959),
29 U.S.C. § 160(m) (1964). Thus, the individual would be assured of a speedy determina-
tion of his claim. On the other hand, the time required for a lawsuit may result in a loss
of wages due to the individual's inability to find a permanent position while the suit is
pending. Sipes v. Vaca, 397 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1965). Furthermore, a con-
siderable passage of time could adversely affect innocent parties. For example, if the suit
took four years to be decided, not an extremely long time when one considers the backlog
of cases before the courts, individuals who had secured employment, received promotions,
or increased their seniority standing in the interim, may be forced to give up these rights
without access to any forum to hear their complaints. These problems may be resolved
in the upcoming Supreme Court decision in Sipes v. Vaca, where the Court may decide
the status of unfair representation charges. Certiorari has been granted. 384 U.S. 969 (1966).
92. Simmons v. Union News Co., 382 U.S. 884, 888 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
* After this comment was in proofs, the Supreme Court decided Vaca v. Sipes, 35
U.S.L. Week 4213 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1967). Printing deadlines and space limitations render It
impossible to fully discuss this important case. Suffice it to note that Vaca concluded that
the NLRB does not have exclusive jurisdiction over unfair representation claims, see
notes 57 & 91 supra, and substantiated the position assumed above regarding the indis-
pensability of an unfair representation charge to a suit alleging a breach of the collective
bargaining agreement. But the Court did not adopt the view that an unfair representation
charge, per se, is tantamount to a breach of contract charge.
